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Abstract-often a security system groups users into a hierarchy, with user classes on top having 
access to objects of user classes below them. Previously proposed cryptographic schemes [l-6] assign 
a key to each user class. Any user can compute from his key the keys of all user classes who are 
below him in the hierarchy, thus giving him their access privileges. Moreover, these schemes prevent 
the possibility of users collaborating to compute a key to which they are not entitled. The major 
disadvantage of the proposed schemes is that it is not easy to add a new user without having to 
change most of the previously defined keys. The other major disadvantage is the amount of storage 
it takes to store the keys. 
In this paper, we overcome these problems whenever the number of user classes is large and the 
hierarchical structure is non-skewed. The proposed algorithm, inspired by a remarkable concept 
invented by S. J. MscKinnon et al. [5], also permits a user to access all files of users who are below 
him in the class hierarchy. It makes it easy, however, to add new user keys without affecting most of 
the previously-assigned keys. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider a partially ordered set (poset) S of user classes Vi. We desire that a user in any one of 
these classes can compute from his key the keys of all users classes which are below him in the 
hierarchy. Also let there be a top-level node Uc, called the central authority, which is in charge 
of computation and distribution of keys. For a communications security system, this top-level 
node would also be responsible for the secure transmission of data among users. The partial 
ordering Vi 5 Uj means that user j can access any information of user i, but user i cannot access 
any of user j’s information. Since Vi < Uo for all i, no user can access the central authority’s 
information. 
In a secure broadcast system, for example, the central authority is in charge of computing keys 
for users groups and distributing these keys secretly to the user groups. When it broadcasts a 
message M to users in group Up, this message should be readable only by any user in any group 
U,, where Up I U,. 
Several such schemes have been proposed within the last decade [l-S]. However, almost all of 
these schemes have a major drawback; most of the previously assigned keys need to be changed 
whenever a new user joins the system. In this paper, we attempt to overcome this drawback. We 
also decrease the size of the storage needed for the keys. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: in Section 2, we will briefly review some of the 
existing access control schemes for hierarchically structured user classes. In Section 3, we will 
propose the improved algorithm for assigning keys, which does not have the above-mentioned 
drawback. In Section 4, we compare this scheme with the approach of MacKinnon et al., and 
analyze the security of our scheme. Finally, some conclusions are given in Section 5. 
Typ-et by -4+&W 
71 
72 C. C. CHANG AND D. J. BUEHRER 
2. CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH HIERARCHICAL 
ACCESS CONTROL 
Given a user hierarchy structure, the important property of permitting key Ki to be computed 
from Kj iff Vi < Uj in the hierarchy is usually implemented as follows [3]: 
(4 
(b) 
cc> 
Akl 
For Vi 5 Uj, the central authority will assign two public integers ti and tj such that 
ti = 2*tj for some integer 2. 
The secret key Ki for user i is given by the formula 
Ki = (Ko)~’ mod m, (1) 
where KO is the secret key of the central authority and m is the product of a pair of large 
numbers. 
The secret key Ki of Vi can be computed from Kj by the following formula iff Vi < Uj: 
Ki = (Ko)t* mod m = Ki = (Ko)tj(tiltj) mod m = Ki’ltj mod m. (2) 
and Taylor [3] proposed one such security scheme where the integers tits were computed 
as a product of prime numbers 
ti = JJ Pjy 
U,N<Ui 
(3) 
where {Pj} is a private sequence of prime numbers chosen by Uo. Notice from Formula (2) above 
that the key Ki can be computed from Kj with the knowledge of the public values of ti and 
tj. However, Kj cannot be computed from Ki. Also, it is not possible for users in subgroups to 
combine their knowledge to compute the key of their supergroup. Let us now look at a simple 
example of the scheme proposed by Akl and Taylor. 
EXAMPLE 1. 
Consider a hierarchy such as the one shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. A user hierarchy. 
To make computations simple, we assume that the central authority has chosen to assign the 
smallest prime numbers for the Pj’s. By Formula (3), the ti assigned to each node is the product 
of the prime numbers associated with nodes which are not below it in the hierarchy. Therefore, 
we have the following values for the ti’s: 
t1 = 1 
tz=2*5*7*13*17=15470. 
t3 = 2 * 3 * 7 * 17 = 714. 
tl=2*3*5*7*11=2310. 
Q,=2*3*5*7*13*17=46410. 
ts=2*3*5*7*11*17=39270. 
t7 = 2 * 3 * 5 * 7 * 11 * 13 = 30030. 
te = 2 * 3 * 5 * 7 * 11* 13 * 17 = 510510. 
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From the example, it is evident that the products of prime numbers can get too large for efficient 
implementation. S. J. MacKinnon et al. [5] made a major contribution to the practicality of this 
scheme by showing that the ti’s could instead be computed by the formula 
where the nj are the powers of prime numbers. The partially ordered set S is first decomposed 
into disjoint chains, with the longest chains using the smallest prime numbers. The top node in 
the ith chain uses t = primei, and the nth node in the chain uses the nth power of this prime 
for its value of t = (primei)n. One such possible chain decomposition of Example 1 is given in 
Figure 2. It can be seen that the values of the t+,‘s are now much smaller. 
P2 
Figure 2. One possible chain decomposition of Figure 1. 
Although MacKinnon et al. claimed that their proposal was an optimal algorithm for assigning 
public keys ti’s [4], we have developed a method for which the values of the ti’s can be greatly 
reduced if the values of ti do not need to be updated when adding a new user. 
3. OUR APPROACH 
The main difference between our approach and that of MacKinnon et al. is the method of 
generating keys. In order to explain our key generation algorithm, let us therefore recopy Figure 1 
using our new values of ti (See Figure 3). 
The values of ti are not made public. Rather, the value of the one-way trap door function f(ti) 
is used to encode the values of ti: 
f(ti) = (ti)” mod m, (5) 
where (e, m) is a public integer pair and m is the product of two large primes. Later we will 
show that the value of f(ti) * [f(tj)]- ’ in GF(m) is equivalent to the value of (ti/tj)” mod m iff 
Vi 5 Uj. 
We will now present the algorithm for calculating the public key for each user group Vi. We 
will indicate private values, known only to the given user class and ancestor classes, by putting 
them inside of square brackets [I. Table 1 below summarizes which symbols are public or private. 
The algorithm for key generation can now be stated, as follows: 
ALGORITHM 1: KEY GENERATION. 
Input: A directed acyclic graph G. 
Output: Public integers f(ti) and secret keys Ki. 
Step 1: Compute the depth of each node of G. 
Step 2: Let {VI, Vz, . . . , I&} be a list of nodes sorted in non-increasing order according to their 
depths. 
Step 3: Assign any positive integer r as the value tl of node VI. 
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Table 1. Symbols used in key generation algorithm. 
User Class Vi 
Holder Symbol 
Central Authority Uo [P? 41 
f0 
ti 
T 
e 
m 
Meaning 
Prime components of m 
One-way trapdoor function 
Key information about user i 
Random integer for to 
Integer 
Product of two large primes 
Cryptographic key 
Public integer 
Let e = 3, r = 2, PI = 2, 9 = 3, 
t1 =T=2 
t2 = t1 * PI = 4 
t3 = tl * P2 = 6 
t4 = t1 * P3 = 10 
t5 = Icm(t2, t3) = 12 
t6 = Icm(t3, t4) = 30 
t7 = t1 * P4 = 14 
Ps = 5, P4 = 7, P5 = 11. 
f (tl) = 23 mod m = 8 mod m K1 = Kofct’) mod m = Ki mod m mod m 
f (t2) = 43 mod m = 64 mod m K2 = Kofct2) mod m = Kg4 mod m mod m 
f (t3) = 63 mod m = 216 mod m K3 = K,fcts) mod m = Ko216 mod m mod m 
f (t4) = lo3 mod m = 1000 mod m K4 = Kofct’) mod m = KAooo mod m mod m 
f (ts) = lZ3 mod m = 1728 mod m KS = Kofct3) mod m = KAr2’ mod m mod m 
f (t6) = 303 mod m = 27000 mod m Ks = Kofct3) mod m = Ki7000 *Od m mod m 
f (t7) = 143 mod m = 2744 mod m K7 = Kofct4) mod m = Ko744 mod m mod m 
Figure 3. Poset with our new values of ti. 
Step 4: Define an array P[l..n] of coprime numbers, sorted in increasing order. 
Step 5: Let i = 1. 
Step 6: For j = 2 to n 
If indegree == 1, then 
{tj := tk * Pi; 
i:=i+l 
1 
Else / * indegree > 1 * / 
{S’ := {ti 1 Vi is a direct ancestor of Vj}; 
tj := lcm(S’); 
) 
Compute the public integer f(tj) by the formula 
f(tj) := t; mod ~2 
Compute the secret key Kj for Vj by the formula 
Kj := &z mod * mod m 
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Now, we will also present Algorithm 2 for computing the key Ki of any user class Vi below the 
given CRESS Uj having key Kj. 
ALGORITHM 2: CALCULATING KEYS OF DESCENDANT CLASSES. 
Input: Secret key Kj, public integers f(ti), f(tj). 
Output: Secret key Ki. 
Step 1: D := [f(tj)]-’ mod m 
Step 2: E := f(ti) * D mod m 
Step 3: Ki := (Kj)E mod m 
It can easily be &e&d that Ki := (Kj)E m&m = Kiti'tj)e modm modm = Kp'(t'/t'))' modm 
modm=K;t modm mod m = Ki modm. Since f(ti) * [f(tj)]- i is equivalent to (ti/tj)” mod m 
iff i 5 j, a user in class Uj can only calculate the keys of user classes which are below him in the 
hierarchy. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a new method to control access in a hierarchically structured environment. 
There 
(1) 
(2) 
are two major differences between our scheme and the one proposed by MacKinnon et al. 
When adding a new user, the number of secret keys which have to be altered is minimal. 
See the examples in Figures 5 and 6 and Table 2. In most cases, new classes of users 
would be added to the bottom of the hierarchy, in which case no old keys would need to 
be modified. 
MacKinnon et al’s scheme requires that the poset must be decomposed into chains. Since 
our algorithm does not do such a decomposition, its method of generating keys is simpler. 
Figure 4. Adding new user class Ug. 
Figure 5. Adding connection between U7 and Ug. 
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1 Keys to be altered 
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Table 2. Secret keys to be altered. 
1 Fig. 5 1 Fig. 6 
Our Scheme None U7, U8 
MacKinnon et al.‘s Scheme U2. U3, U4. U5, U6. U7, U8 U2. U3, U4, U5, U6, U7, U8 
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